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ABSTRACT
Does something called global generations exist? Do we need to adopt a cosmopolitan outlook to 
understand the generational dynamic? It was Karl Mannheim who first drew attention to the role of 
generations in historical change, and who highlighted the importance of traumatic historical events 
in the creation of a generational consciousness. A “cosmopolitan vision” means social sciences and 
humanities which get rid off “methodological nationalism” and take globality and human social life on 
planet Earth seriously. Cosmopolitan social science differs from universalist science in that it is not 
based on something supposedly general, but on global variability, global interconnection and global 
intercommunication. Cosmopolitan sociology doesn’t mean treating global generations as a  single, 
universal generation with common symbols and a single consciousness. Rather, it conceptualises 
and analyses a multiplicity of global generations which appear as a set of interwoven futures. The 
relationships between these futures are no longer to be seen in terms of a polar star radiation from 
the North Atlantic segment of the globe, but as something in a wide spectrum of possible interactions 
of modernities.
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Is there such a thing as global generations? What does global generation mean? Is 
there a consciously active global generation? Can we, as we did so far, still understand 
the concept of generation in a national frame of reference? Or do we need a cosmopoli-
tan outlook to understand the generational dynamics that exacerbate inter-generational 
tensions within nations and intra-generational affinities and conflicts between nations? 
This lecture1 is a risk! Especially, of course, for myself. I have no data to present. There 
is no consistent theory either. There are only “suggestions and refutations” (to quote 
Karl Raimund Popper). But so things get started. My intention is to provoke a reflec-
tion which is obviously necessary (maybe it is going on already): You, students and 
researchers from different countries, are one of the principle examples of a cosmopolitan 
academy of the global generation. You have personal knowledge of different national and 
traditional contexts and are both experiencing and establishing new transnational life 
forms and networks. Is this true or is this fiction? Is this part of your self-identity and 
your future ambitions, privately and politically? Of course, not I, you have to answer 
those questions.
It was Karl Mannheim who first drew attention to the role of generations –as distin-
guished from social classes– in historical change. In answering the question, what makes 
a generation? He had a very important point for our discussion today: he stressed not 
only the role of communication but also the importance of traumatic historic events in 
creating a generational consciousness. Nowadays there is, of course, the Internet genera-
tion, which shares information and ideas across borders, making a global impact. And 
the traumatic historic event? There is the 9/11 Generation (Edmunds & Turner, 2005). 
It will be conscious of the negative effects of terrorism on life-chances (with respect 
to travel, urban security, employment worldwide, civil liberties, religious and national 
identities and the marginalisation or empowerment of the post-colonial world). It is, 
therefore, distinct from the 1989 Generation (the “Fall-of-the-Berlin-Wall Generation”), 
which experienced the world after the Cold War as an open space. But at the same time 
the concept and image of a 9/11 Generation is a highly ambivalent one. This traumatic 
‘cosmopolitan event’ - 9/11 - was celebrated by opponents of ‘Western Imperialism’. A 
distinction should evidently be made between generational awareness and generational 
consciousness - that is, we are all aware of 9/11, but the consciousness produced may be 
different –some becoming more cosmopolitan, others more anti-cosmopolitan.
Then we might distinguish the Climate Change or Global Warming Generation. This 
global generation fraction is not passive but active and political. It doesn’t need to be 
told, that in order to prevent London, New York or Tokyo from disappearing under the 
rising sea-level, there has to be an invention of global politics. There is no British way to 
save London, no American way to save New York, no Japanese way to save Tokyo. Only a 
new cosmopolitan realism, an awareness of the need for co-operation between states could 
become the resource for coping with the challenges produced by climate change. 
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Finally, as the creation of a global as opposed to a national generational conscious-
ness, there is a Princess Diana Generation; the reference points here include, for example, 
the rise of global consumer brands (such as McDonalds, Nike or Madonna). Globalised 
‘Consumer Generations’ comprise very different fractions; not only those, who buy and 
live with these brands and images, but also those who are unable to buy and live with 
these symbols, but risk their lives to become migrants to the consumer paradises of the 
Western World or Dubai. 
Developing my argument I have ten theses:
TheSiS one
A cosmopolitan sociology is required in order to understand the situations, 
impacts, divisions, contradictions and desires of the global generations
A cosmopolitan sociology means a sociology which gets rid off methodological 
nationalism and takes globalism and (human) social life on planet Earth seriously. A 
cosmopolitan sociology differs from a universalistic one by starting, not from anything 
supposedly general but from global variability, global interconnectedness and global 
intercommunication. Cosmopolitan sociology means treating the global generations 
not as a single, universal generation with common symbols and a unique consciousness. 
Rather, it conceptualises and analyses a multiplicity of global generations which appear 
as a set of intertwined futures. The relations between these futures are no longer to be 
seen in terms of a polar star radiation from the North Atlantic segment of the globe, but 
as involving a wide range of possible interactions of modernities.
Cosmopolitan sociology entails a turn away from both the provincial self-centred-
ness of the nation state and from the exotic gaze of the coloniser on the colonised (and 
the other way around). There is no longer any legitimate (central) point from which to 
look out on the rest of the world and communicate with it. In other words, a cosmo-
politan sociology or social science is something far more demanding and has far greater 
consequences, than an interest in globalisation, mobile capital and challenges to the sov-
ereignty of the nation state. It means a decisive break with the Eurocentric perspective 
of the sociological classics and of much of conventional sociology today. A cosmopolitan 
sociology amounts to a fundamental shift of imagination, as well as of investigation, 
from the nations in the North Atlantic frame of reference to a cosmopolitan social world 
with no privileged national observation post and no absolute time (or chronology). The 
potential implications of globality for sociological theory and research are as revolution-
ary as Einstein’s theory of relativity for Newtonian physics.
Global Generations in World Risk Society
Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 82-83206
TheSiS TWo 
There are specific cultural codes which might generate global 
generations
If one inquires as to the cultural code of the global generations, then the fol-
lowing fact takes centre stage: For the first time in history the rising generations of 
all countries, nations, ethnic groups, religions are living in a common present. Every 
nation has become the immediate neighbour of every other, and crises on one side of 
the world are communicated to the whole population of the globe at extraordinary 
speed. But this actual common present is not based on a common past and does not 
in the least guarantee a common future. If this new generational experience of uni-
versal neighbourhood is to have consequences, that promise more than a tremendous 
growth in mutual hate and a more or less general getting on each other’s nerves, then 
a process of mutual understanding and progressive self-explanation on a gigantic 
scale must begin. 
Added to the condition of a common present is the “culture of immediacy” (John 
Tomlinson). But what is immediacy? It can be taken as referring to a sense of cultural 
proximity, to an increasing sense of connectedness with others, and, perhaps, to a sense 
of compulsion. What links all these features is a perception of the general dissolution of 
mediation, of an intervening element, a middle term. What in the past has separated 
−now from later, here from elsewhere, desire from its satisfaction− is melting away. 
Contemporary rhetoric in relation to terrorism is dramatic in its immediacy and blunt 
when it comes to contextualisation. It fights for attention in the political spaces that 
only the media provide. It fights for a response from the global audience. Terrorism 
itself depends on what has been called the “oxygen of immediate publicity” (Roger 
Silverstone).
You can apply the basic idea of Mannheim’s sociology of generation in a modi-
fied form: it is the symbolic code of traumatic cosmopolitan events which constitute 
the new space of experience, of global generations in the world risk society. So, global 
generations are also global risk generations. What is global, in fact, is not necessarily 
the catastrophe, but the anticipation of catastrophe. This is what risk is about. Risks 
bring home to us a condition of the world, which does not (yet) exist. The key ques-
tion which confronts the global generations is this: How is this anticipation, this 
presence of future catastrophes produced and thereby averted? In what ways does a 
global risk come by the prefix actual, that is, as anticipation how does it dominate 
people’s minds, the institutions across the boundaries of nations, regions, religions, 
political parties, rich and poor? And why is it, that the anticipation of catastrophe is 
a stimulation to the re-invention of politics?
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The creeping climate catastrophe −more precisely: the anticipation of it− has effec-
tively become a constitutive experience of the global generation, even a post-utopian, 
but also politically activating generational experience. 
Now, in the main part of my lecture, I will present three (interdependent) transna-
tional constellations of the global generations: the transnational constellation of equality 
and migration, the 9/11-generation of terrorism and the Western insecure-generation.
TheSiS ThRee
Expectations of equality and migration dreams constitute an impor-
tant fraction of global generations
Until now the perception of social inequality has often been curiously narrow, limited 
by the frame of reference of methodological nationalism. That is to say, social inequality has 
been only considered a problem internally, within the nation state and the national society. To 
the extent that poverty, hunger, oppression take place somewhere outside, beyond the borders 
of one’s own country, they do not have become a public scandal. It’s true, pictures of starv-
ing children in Africa appear in the media again and again, and in the short term they have 
produced an outcry −but this has been essentially a humanitarian reflex, containing next to no 
political legitimation pressure, hardly translated into sustained political action. And a similar 
basic attitude also prevails in academic sociology. There the topic of global inequalities has 
been hardly registered at all, still less closely investigated, because it has lain outside the limits 
of the nation state and so outside the professional angle of vision.
That at least is how it has been until now. With a generational change, however, 
a shift is taking place, the nation state legitimation of global inequality is beginning to 
crumble. This could be put down to the increasingly deep and acute division between 
haves and have-nots on a world scale. It is significant that a movement towards more 
equality is nevertheless making headway, at least in terms of norms. The stimuli for that 
are to be found at different levels. Their combined effect is that principles and expectations 
of equality are spreading worldwide.
– Postcolonial discourse of equality: In the era of colonial rule the inferiority of 
the Others/ the “natives”/ the “savages” seemed a more or less natural given. The 
postcolonial discourse has divested such assumptions of any legitimation.
– The nation state dualism of human rights and civil rights has broken down: A 
guarantee of human rights has been normatively prescribed at ever more levels 
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−e.g. in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the EU 
Treaties and the constitutions of many nation states. Such guarantees make it 
increasingly difficult to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, nationals 
and non-nationals and to grant certain rights only to some and not to others.
– Spread of transnational ways of life: As recent migration research has frequently 
pointed out, there are today more and more groups whose members do not live 
in one country or another, but in two, or perhaps even more, at the same time. 
Such people have a bridge function. By building up transnational networks, 
organisations, institutions, by regularly visiting relatives in the old country, 
they create numerous links between country of origin and receiving society 
−and simultaneously contribute to the export of Western ways of life, norms, 
demands.
The global generations are living in a global culture of comparison. The principle 
of uncomparibility between the haves and the have-nots on a global scale is dissolving. 
This is true why norms and expectations of equality and justice have now increas-
ingly spread world-wide, with far-reaching consequences. Inequality between First 
World and the majority is no longer accepted as fate, but emphatically called into 
question, even if only one-sidedly, by those outside. It is the others, the excluded, the 
inhabitants of distant lands and continents who are beginning to rebel against the 
legitimation of social inequality which has been taken for granted until now −through 
hopes and dreams of migration, which they are translating into action.
Understood in this sense the active global generation is definitely not the Western, 
but the non-Western generation, rising up against inequality across nation state borders, 
putting down a claim on equality. “I want in” is the watchword of this worldwide genera-
tion standing at the gates of the Western societies and vigorously rattling the bars.
TheSiS foUR
Dealing with terrorism has become the experiential space of the 
9/11 generation
What is historically new, what characterises the generational experience at the begin-
ning of the 21st century, was already summed up by Friedrich Nietzsche 150 years ago 
in the phrase the “age of comparison”: All the regions of the world, just like all cultural 
creations and symbols  −from the most primitive to the most modern− co-exist in one and 
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the same present and, detached from their temporal and spatial context, are for the most 
part generally available, maybe appropriated, by fundamentalists or by individuals.
A good example of that is the quantity of religious Internet sites. Here there is an 
immense bazaar of ways of making sense of the world, through which individuals roam, 
and where they pick up whatever they fancy. In addition to this explosion of virtual reli-
gion a growing flood of publications on religious topics, to say nothing of films and TV 
are contributing to a dramatic change in the landscape of the institutionalised religions 
- even if to many this all appears arbitrary and superficial. “Two out of three French 
teenagers from Catholic families have never attended mass or a children’s service. On 
the other hand they have no doubt seen films like Little Buddha, Seven Years in Tibet, or 
Witness. Through these films they will have come into contact with the world of other 
religions, or with themes drawn from the New Age Movement and spiritual ecology. 
It is quite possible that they have been confronted with the Gospels for the first time 
through a popular musical. Hence they will have discovered, even if in a very anecdotal 
and unreliable way, the existence of various cultural, religious and spiritual worlds, which 
remained largely unknown to their grandparents”. (Hervieu-Léjer, 2006: 6)
The loss of tradition and of geographical location is very ambivalent process for 
the old world religions. Globalisation represents not only a great opportunity for the 
world religions to free themselves from the territorial ties of ethnic cultures, national 
society and the nation state; an opportunity to rediscover and revive their transnational 
dimensions, networks and conceptions of community and mutuality. Because at the same 
time the exclusive claims of the religions to truth and authority are also challenged, and 
their dislocation dissolves the seemingly “natural” ties between lived and suffered pasts, 
peoples and territories, which in the past constituted the unity of civilisation and world 
religions (and which Samuel Huntington mistakenly sees in essentialist terms and sup-
poses to hold good for all times to come). 
At least two religious forms of appropriation of modernity may be distinguished: 
the anti-modern and the post-modern. Anti-modern fundamentalism is of modern ori-
gin. It renews itself thanks to the overlapping of post-modernism and post-colonialism and 
their reciprocal reinforcement and empowerment. The era of post-colonialism begins 
where the colonised cultures, societies and religions seek to free themselves from the 
influence of Western imperialism. But intellectually this self-liberation succeeds, because 
the former colonies appropriate the post-modern dismissal (of the grand narratives) of 
Western modernity. Post-modernism as self-criticism of Western modernity, makes pos-
sible and empowers, intellectually at least, post-colonialism. The door that opens here, 
however, can swing in opposite directions: towards a fundamentalist anti-modernity on 
the one side, post-modern religious variety on the other.
This is the point I want to get to: Modern arguments for a religious anti-modernity 
can be constructed from the combination of post-colonialism and post-modernism; that 
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is, for a return to the “pure”, precolonial, premodern foundations and fundamentalisms of 
religious truths and practices. This reaction is then simultaneously modern and anti-modern 
to the extent that Western modernity is rejected with the help of Western post-modernism. 
It is accompanied by an insistence, that there is only one true religious narrative, only the 
one true religious path of personal conduct as of the arrangement of society and politics 
(whoever defines and sanctions it as mandatory in what way and for whom). Here a spe-
cific segment of the global generation is appearing, a fundamentalist segment: a hybrid of 
modern-anti-modern, post-colonial and individualised fundamental religiosity, giving rise 
to religiously motivated terrorism. This by no means derives from a revival of tradition. 
Rather, its preconditions are both transnationalisation and individualisation and it emerges, 
therefore, from a fusion of extremes −pre-modernism and anti-modernism. 
Although this fundamentalism appeals to tradition, it is in a certain sense anti-
traditional. It is more or less defined by the rejection of established tradition, since it 
propagates a return to a pure first beginning, one not “soiled” by history. It is precisely 
because it reduces the world to a simple dichotomy between faith and lack of it, of for-
bidden and permitted, that it may have provided the basis of an Islamic International 
of terror: a “BigMac of Islam”, which extinguishes lived traditions, levels all differences 
and ambivalences, denies all local character, including its own, which it proclaims as 
universally valid. Anyone who looks for the origins of 11th September in the Koran or 
in the Middle Ages is trivialising the issues, is looking in the wrong direction. Islamic 
terrorism, too, is shaped by the cultural codes of the global generations: the common 
ground of the present and the divergence of past and futures, the “culture of immediacy” 
as well as the “culture of comparison”.
TheSiS five
United through decline: Flexible capitalism constitutes insecure gen-
erations in the context of the Western welfare state 
Flexibility is one of the code words of global capitalism and therefore of the global 
generations as well. “Flexible man” (Richard Sennett) means flexible generations. Change 
regimes of capitalism are, as Sennett shows, inimical to this. And so the rhetoric of labour 
flexibility and adaptability can actually be read as a set of instructions −now increasingly 
issued by modern governments− to abandon hard-won rights not just of economic life 
but of culture. It is puzzling that resistance to this trend towards employment insecurity 
is so weak. 
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This structural transformation of the world of work with its drastic consequences for 
individual biographies is confirmed by many studies. It is especially pronounced, accord-
ing to Angela McRobbie, in the various branches of the culture industry (McRobbie, 
2005). Permanent posts having been eliminated, a strange world has taken shape here, 
where ambitious dreams are translated into poorly paid work contracts. In the graphic 
arts and in design, in museums, in the media, in these and similar areas young men 
and women congregate, who −after they have completed long and demanding train-
ing courses− now want to apply their skills and imagination. For the privilege of being 
allowed to work in their chosen field they don’t ask questions about hours never mind 
about pensions. A world of creative one-person businesses has grown up, which entails 
highly motivated self-exploitation.
The whole world of work is affected by the transformation, but it hits young 
workers particularly hard. “British children: poorer, at greater risk and more insecure” 
−runs the headline of today’s Guardian. In France précarité has become the current term, 
likewise referring to the new insecurity; and last spring, protesting against précarité, 
thousands of young people took to the streets, called for strikes, put the government 
under pressure.
The geographical reach of this structural transformation is confirmed by a large com-
parative study with the symptomatic title “Globalization, Uncertainty and Youth in Society” 
(Blossfeld et al., 2005). Included are young men and women in 12 OECD countries, from 
Hungary to Canada, from Germany to Mexico, broken down by age cohort, education 
and/or training background and qualifications. The empirical findings presented in detailed 
calculations and numerous tables confirm the general trend, insecurity is increasing every-
where. Beyond that three more precise differentiations are discernible:
– First, it really is the younger generation which is most affected. “Youth, who 
have less labour market experience and who are not yet shielded by internal labour 
markets, are more greatly exposed to the forces of globalization, which makes them 
the losers of globalization” (Blossfeld et al., 2005: 423).
– Second, all young people are affected, but not all young people equally. It is those 
at the lower end of the social and employment hierarchy who are exposed to the 
greatest risks: “It was the manual, un- and semi-skilled workers that were the most 
impacted by the recent changes... Youth in lower occupational classes showed a 
higher risk of being employed on temporary contracts, becoming or remaining 
unemployed, remaining entrapped in insecure positions, or having no pension 
benefits” (Blossfeld et al. 2005: 426). 
– Third and finally, varying country profiles were also evident, the result of differ-
ent welfare state regulations and socio-cultural norms. “In Italy and Spain, youth 
with lower levels of education were actually more likely to find a first job. In these 
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employment systems highly educated youth need to get a high-quality job match 
when entering the labour market. If they obtain a job below their qualification 
level, it is much more difficult to get back on track. This is in stark contrast from 
the ‘stop-gap’ circuit that youth from open employment systems undergo, where 
lower-level jobs have comparatively less of a ‘scarring’ effect on their long-term 
careers” (Blossfeld et al. 2005: 426).
Two conclusions may be drawn from these and similar findings: First, that the 
increasing insecurity, which is becoming the basic experience of the younger generations, 
is not a local, regional or national phenomenon. Rather, this insecurity is turning into a 
key, common experience, transcending borders, one we can sum up in the words: united 
in decline. Beyond that there is a paradoxical, explosive simultaneity to be discovered 
here. In the First World, and especially for younger people there, the risks, the insecuri-
ties of life are growing. Meanwhile, however, the countries that constitute it remain the 
dream destination for many of the young in the poor regions of the globe. Consequently 
the existential fears of the former are going to encounter the hopes for the future of 
the latter. On one side a generation less (which, measured by previous decades, has to 
accept material losses); on the other a generation more (which, motivated by images of 
an affluent West, wants a share of that wealth); and both, and this is the crucial point, 
part of “the global generations”. What is already becoming visible in outline today, will 
perhaps emerge even more dramatically in future: a new global redistribution struggle. 
One side on the defensive, trying to hold on to the remnants of affluence with laws and 
frontier barriers; the other setting out to charge against these same frontiers with all its 
strength, driven by the hope of a better life. The result is a conflict-laden interaction: 
one fraction of the global generations against the other.
TheSiS Six
Is the emergence of global generations really a new phenomenon? 
Anyone with knowledge of history will regard the emphasis on the 
new with a degree of scepticism, perhaps even suggest historical 
continuities
Was the political dynamic at the end of the 19th and start of the 20th centuries 
−one may ask− not already essentially characterised by a new internationalism of politi-
cal generations? There was the Socialist International and a variety of peace movements 
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which made the worldwide achievement of universalist principles their central demand? 
Was it not already the resistance to German Fascism which, more than anything else, 
contributed to the formation of a political generation Europe? And is not, of course, the 
generation of 1968 they key example of a global generation, because its political activities 
ignored national boundaries and gave a significant impetus to cosmopolitan thinking? 
So, isn’t it true that globalization cannot fully understood without this impact of this 
first active global generation?
Such questions are, of course, justified. Yet against that a number of features can 
also be mentioned, which clearly distinguish the movement of ‘68 from global genera-
tions at the beginning of the 21st century. The 1968 generation was essentially politi-
cally constituted, adherence to it was defined by participation in protests. At the start of 
the 21st century, in contrast, it is traumatic cosmopolitan experiences and events, which 
have become the key to the space of expectation of the rising generations. To sum up: 
Then there was collective action, today there is individualist reaction. Then there were 
critics of consumer society and the culture industry −today’s generations are in a sense 
the children of the latter. They no longer relate the promises of global consumer society 
solely to the possibilities their own country offers −but derive from them the impetus 
to tear down the barriers separating the West from the rest. These global generations are 
at heart unpolitical, because they break down into different fractions in a conflictual 
relationship with each other.
I have sketched out three generational constellations: the transnational generation 
of equality and migration, the 9/11 generation of global terrorism and the Western 
insecure generation, united in decline. Each of those reflects specific sections of world 
risk society and correspondingly contradictory experiences and positions. They have 
a methodological point in common: They all no longer understand generation solely 
within the frame of the nation state and its conditions. They initiate −to put it at its most 
ambitious− a cosmopolitan turn and perspective in generational sociology. In order to 
carry this approach further, at least three steps are necessary. 
TheSiS Seven
What is needed is a critique of methodological nationalism
Whatever does not have its causes in the internal space of a nation state and is not lim-
ited to it can also not be described and explained solely by looking at this nation state. That 
means, for example, that youth and generation sociology research which explains the situation 
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of the up and coming generation in Germany primarily by reference to German prewar and 
post-war history, the German school system etc., is becoming, given social reality, increasingly 
anachronistic. Whereas First Modernity was constructed on the fundamental conditions of 
the nation state, of the national society as a separate unit, today Germany or any other coun-
try, or indeed Europe, no longer exist as closed, walled-off societies. Anyone who doesn’t see 
the multitude of interconnections produced by production and consumption, Internet and 
TV, tourism and advertising, lacks an all-important key to grasping the hopes and dreams, 
the fears and disappointments, the actions and reactions of the global generations. It’s as if one 
were to consult only a map of Bavaria to find out how to get to Singapore.
TheSiS eiGhT
In the global generations various transnational fractions are interlinked, 
forming globalised patchwork generations, the mosaic pieces of which 
simply cannot be fitted together to make a unified picture
More pointedly, it is just this non-unity which permits the unity in diversity of the 
generational constellations to emerge −at the centre, on the periphery and through the 
opposition and interaction between them. It is the mono-national, mono-cultural gaze, 
which fails to recognise, that the activism of the global generations arises less at the centre 
than in the peripheral zones, in the regions of the world risk society has condemned 
to hopelessness. The protest of the migration generation is directed not so much at the 
established authorities of their own society of origin - but at the international order of 
inequality and its guardians. The attack on fortress Europe is able to adopt as its own the 
human right to mobility, which the West likes to proclaim. Then, of course, it collides 
with the fears of the European insecure generation, which is beginning to protest against 
short-term work contracts and falling incomes. They are mobilizing themselves on the 
basis of their own material interests against the state.
TheSiS nine
A youth and generational sociology which does justice even only 
approximately to the lived reality of the global generations requires 
a methodological cosmopolitanism
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It must at least be able to answer the key question: What is going to replace the 
nation state unit of investigation known as “generation”? In this lecture, in order 
to make a start, I have substituted the image of various transnational generational 
constellations for the nation state-defined concept of a “generation”. In doing so I 
merely sketched their reciprocal but tense relationship; the question, how global 
generations emerge, has hardly been touched on. But this much should by now 
have become clear: The critique of methodological nationalism involves much more 
than just a problem of empirical data, which are largely collected and analysed on 
a nation state basis. More profoundly it’s about how the core sociological con-
cept of generation (like the concepts of social inequality, the state, the family, the 
household, justice, neighbourhood etc.) can be liberated from the mental horizon 
of methodological nationalism and opened up to the fundamental transformation 
of globalised Second Modernity. 
TheSiS Ten (iT iS RaTheR a qUeSTion)
As a member of the global generations, what would my greatest 
hope and my greatest concern be? Let me start with the hope and 
then come to the concern
My greatest hope is that in global risk society there is hidden a new cosmopolitan 
moment which can be activated by the global generations. This cosmopolitan moment 
is different from that of the old Greek “stoa”, the ius cosmopolitica of the enlightenment 
(Kant) or the “crime against humanity” (Hannah Arendt) from which the human rights 
charta evolved. The big difference is: it is an enforced cosmopolitanism. Global risk tears 
down national boundaries and mixes us with them. The distant other is becoming the 
inclusive other. Everyday life is becoming cosmopolitan: people have to make sense of 
their own life in exchange with others from all parts of the globe. This cosmopolitan 
moment is becoming a key element of the generational experience. And from this can 
be drawn and built a cosmopolitan system based on the acknowledgement of cultural 
diversity and the dignity of the other. So far in history cosmopolitanism has been stig-
matized as idealism and nationalism, has been praised as realism. But now it is exactly 
the other way around: cosmopolitanism is realism, because it provides the most positive 
way to deal with global problems which are insoluble at the level of individual state, but 
manageable through cooperation. With my understanding of cosmopolitanism people 
are having wings and roots at the same time.
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My greatest concern looking at the world from your point of view is no longer the 
metaphysical homelessness of a Beckett, or the vision of surveillance of a Foucault, nor 
the despotism of rationality, which alarmed Max Weber. As with good old Communism, 
there is no longer anything spectral about good old post-modernism. What scares me, 
and maybe some of you, seems to be that the fundamental principles of modernity −like 
liberty, rationality, democracy are becoming optional, are being challenged, have to be 
renegotiated in the 21st century.
So everything is turned upside down: What for Weber, Adorno and Foucault was 
a vision of horror −the perfected surveillance rationality of the administered world− is, 
to the global risk generations, more like a promise. It would be nice, if the surveillance 
rationality did keep things under surveillance, it would be nice if only consumption 
and humanism did go on terrorising us, it would be nice if the freedom from break-
down of our systems could be restored by reforms within nation states and “offensives 
of technological innovation”. It would be nice if the repeated formulas of more market, 
more technology, more growth, more flexibility could raise up the unquiet hearts. But 
much more is at stake. It is the temptation and the horror of anti-modernism; the fear, 
that the tissue of our material dependencies and moral obligations could tear, and that 
the sensitive operating system of world risk society could collapse. 
Of course, these are only my impressions. As Mahatma Gandhi said: “Be the 
change you want to happen.”
Note
 1. Editor’s note: The author wrote this article following a talk he gave at the London School of 
Economics.
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